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National Security in the Twenty-First Century
The Honorable Steve Buyer'
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed
Services Committee, I have conducted numerous hearings on the growing problems
facing our service men and women. Although pay and benefits are important, there are
other issues confronting the Force: lack of spare parts, lack of adequate training time,
aging equipment, high depreciation rates on our equipment, longer working hours, and
above all else, prolonged family separation due to an increased operations schedule.
Simply put, asking the military to do more with less is not a strategy for success. Both
our civilian and military leaders have expressed concern about the current situation.
This past summer, Army Secretary Louis Caldera indicated the Army required an
additional 20,000 to 50,000 soldiers to perform its Post Cold War mission.1 The Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps, General James L. Jones has previously commented that
the Marines could use an additional 5,000 personnel. Furthermore, organizations repre-
senting the National Guard and Reserves request lawmakers to stop the planned 25,000
reduction of Reserve components, as mandated by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Re-
2
view.
Why the focus on the structure of the Force? Because the military, along with dip-
lomatic and economic mechanisms, represents one of the three basic elements of na-
tional power. Simply put, the structure of the Force is important because the purpose of
the military is one of the three vehicles to achieve the political objectives laid out by the
President with regard to our national security interests. As such, the military, through the
national military strategy, is assigned the duty to protect our vital national security inter-
ests.
It is now evident that there is a conflict between the current operations assigned the
United States Military and the Clinton Administration's national military strategy.
While discussion in Washington has focused primarily on the Military's insufficient
membership, policy-makers must first discuss the inadequacies of the national military
strategy, which is no longer feasible or sustainable. In sum, our national military strat-
egy reads:
For the foreseeable future U.S. forces must be sufficient in size, versatility and re-
sponsiveness in order to transition from a posture of global engagement to fight and
win in concert with our allies two major theater of wars that occur roughly at the
same time. In this context they must also be able to defeat the initial enemy advance
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in two distant theaters in close succession and to fight and win in situations where
chemical and biological weapons and other asymmetric approaches are employed."3
Why is this strategy no longer feasible? A strategy of adopting a posture of global
engagement conflicts with the purpose of the Nation's military, which is to fight and
with the Nation's battles. In short, President Clinton's national military strategy has our
armed forces engaged throughout the world as quasi-diplomats. Today's military is en-
gaged in peace-enforcement, peace-keeping, nation building, refugee relief, nation-to-
nation military contacts and other humanitarian missions that are non-traditional in na-
ture. While I initially supported nation-to-nation military contacts as a way to help East-
ern Communist Block countries transition to democracy, the President has utilized this
mission to excess.
Currently, there are over 265,000 military personnel serving in over 135 countries.
Despite the presidential policy of "do more with less," Congress remains sensitive to the
burdens of our young men and women serving in the Nation's military and has repeat-
edly funded the Department of Defense well above the President's request year after
year. Unfortunately, in order for military planners in the Pentagon to meet operational
demands, they have been forced repeatedly to divert money intended for the purchase of
ammunition, spare parts, equipment and housing, and have used it to fund these "un-
funded operations." This is assuming a great risk. In Fiscal Year 2000 alone, the un-
funded shortfall in military funding requirements was over $8 billion. Looking forward,
the Service Chiefs have testified that in order to maintain force structure and readiness
to implement the national military strategy, they will need more than $80 billion over
the next six years. These operations are exacerbating the problem. They are draining
Department of Defense's budget and its ability to project accurately future spending
requirements. For example, the Congressional Research Service estimates recent costs
of U.S. military intervention to be:
Rwanda $145 million
Somalia $1.5 billion
Haiti $1 billion and rising
Bosnia $10 billion and rising
South West Asia $8.5 billion and rising
Kosovo $7 billion and rising4
U.S. forces are stretched so thin, that during the Kosovo mission, the United States
was forced to divert planes from their patrols over Iraq in order to support the ongoing
campaign. In early April the Navy shifted its only aircraft carrier in the western Pacific
and its 75 combat jets out of the region indefinitely to help support the Military's efforts
in Yugoslavia. In addition, the Pentagon briefly suspended enforcement of the no-fly
zone over northern Iraq while fighter-bombers and radar-jamming planes were also
dispatched to the air-war over Serbia. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ryan, was
so concerned about the rigors of the operations schedule, that he called for an Air Force-
wide "stand down" after the operation.
These missions also required considerable and growing support from the National
Guard and the Reserves. Over the last several years, National Guard and Reserve units
have been asked to assist in operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Hurricane Mitch relief efforts,
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and Kosovo. In addition, National Guard units have been used in the rotation of the
Sinai Peace-keeping mission, and now military leaders are planning to use National
Guard "Enhanced Brigades" to ease further the burden of the active duty force in the
Balkans. Although the Reserve Components are supposed to act as a combat multiplier
in time of war, they have assumed a post-Cold War role as surrogates and substitutes for
the active Force. While integrating the active and reserve components is the right strat-
egy, the United States must exercise restraint in the employment of its forces.
Equally important, soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines routinely question the "mis-
sion credibility" of these operations. In fact, when U.S. forces intervened in Haiti and
Bosnia they were ultimately employed to perform the functions of the Executive, Leg-
islative and Judicial branches of government. This same scenario holds true in Kosovo.
As a result, the time spent in non-combat military operations seriously undermine a
unit's combat readiness. According to Army Commanders, combat units assigned to
these operations have reported that it requires any where from six months to one year to
retrain personnel for their intended combat purpose: to fight and win the nation's battles.
Clearly, the post-Cold War environment represents a period of considerable turmoil.
In early 1991, after a victorious conclusion to the Persian Gulf War, the United States
enjoyed unipolar military dominance without any prospect of an immediate military
rival. Despite overwhelming victory, the struggle for peace and security continues. The
question for those of us that serve on the House Armed Services Committee, and for
those who appropriate funds on its behalf, is: could we today fight and win a conflict of
similar scale as the Gulf War? Most military planners, including the Service Chiefs,
would respond with caution and alarm. Yet, the United States has had a significant
number of forces in Korea, Iraq, and most recently, the former Yugoslavia and the Bal-
kans.
These regions exist as potential flash points that could easily erupt in the near future,
requiring the commitment of sizeable force. Despite possessing a force structure barely
capable of committing to two near simultaneous major regional conflicts, the United
States has both strategically and operationally committed military forces to three poten-
tial major theaters of conflict, and is engaged in numerous other countries. This Admini-
stration's appetite for foreign military intervention has employed U.S. forces more than
any other President in recent history. As required by the War Powers Resolution, Presi-
dent Clinton notified Congress that he was placing U.S. forces in harms way 50 times,
far more than the last four Presidents combined (seven under President Bush, fourteen
under President Reagan, one under President Carter, and four by President Ford).
Furthermore, the United States has incurred a great financial and geopolitical burden
for each of these major contingencies. Realistically speaking, as long as our allies know
the United States will be there to provide military forces and financing, there is little
incentive for them to accept responsibility for ensuring the security and stability of their
own region. While the United States does have a responsibility to provide certain types
of support (intelligence, communications and possibly logistics), it is time our allies
assume a greater security role in the post-Cold War world. The utilization of U.S. com-
bat forces should be reserved for the critical times when the balance of power in a re-
gion, or the world itself, is n jeopardy.
So what is the appropriate function of United States military forces in light of our
national military strategy? In order to properly answer the question, we must conduct a
global assessment, define or redefine our vital national security interests, determine
existing and potential threats to our national security, review our economic, diplomatic
and military resources, identify a national strategy based on the resources available, and
then formulate a national security strategy to meet our political goals. Once this process
is complete, we can then develop a viable national military strategy. This is the current
2000]
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mission of the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century.
While the Commission's work is aimed toward assessing the future of national security
twenty-five years and beyond, current policy-makers need to recognize that the present
national military strategy undermines the Nation's military forces' performance of pro-
tecting and responding to the Nation's vital security interests. That is the message I will
deliver to the next commander-in-chief. I encourage my colleagues and the American
people to join me.
